From Professor Michael Scharf:
On December 4, 2006, the Iraqi High Tribunal publicly issued the long-awaited English translation of its Opinion supporting the November 5 Judgment in the Dujail Trial – the first trial of Saddam Hussein and seven co-defendants. Available at:
http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/dujail/opinion.asp .
The Dujail Opinion is extraordinary in a number of respects, not the least of which is its length -- 298 single-spaced pages -- and the surprisingly detailed factual findings and sophisticated legal analysis that it contains.On November 20, two days before the Iraqi High Tribunal posted the Arabic version of the Dujail Trial Opinion on its Website and provided it to the Defense Counsel and Prosecutors in hard copy, one of the world’s foremost human rights NGOs, Human Rights Watch, issued a 97-page report, concluding that the “proceedings in the Dujail trial were fundamentally unfair” and that “the soundness of the verdict is questionable.”The Human Rights Watch Report was authored by Nehal Bhuta, HRW's Arthur Helton Fellow who had observed parts of the trial and interviewed defense counsel and other trial participants (not including the presiding judges).
As a disclaimer, let me begin by acknowledging that I am a huge fan of Human Rights Watch. Case School of Law’s Frederick K. Cox International Law Center, which I direct, has a special relationship with the NGO under which every year two of my best students get to spend the summer as legal interns at the Human Rights Watch Offices in New York and DC. And the Executive Director of the NGO, Ken Roth, is scheduled to deliver the “Klatsky Endowed Lecture in Human Rights” at Case on February 13, 2007.
Although there are many valid observations and excellent recommendations contained in the November 20th Human Rights Watch Report, the subsequent issuance of the Dujail Trial Opinion indicates that the NGO should have followed the age-old adage -- “Never judge a book by its cover.” In other words, because it did not wait to analyze the actual Opinion of the Dujail Case, the broad conclusion of the Human Rights Watch Report turned out to be premature and largely unfounded. Below, I will briefly indicate a few of the ways the Dujail Opinion sheds new light on the overall fairness and integrity of the Saddam Trial.
The Standard of ProofOn numerous occasions during the Dujail trial, Human Rights Watch and other critics of the Tribunal publicly decried the fact that the Tribunal’s Statute and Rules do not require it to find “proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Well, it turns out that the Tribunal did in fact employ the “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” standard -- the phrase is used in the opinion over two-dozen times.
Disposition of Defense MotionsThe Human Rights Watch Report harshly criticized the Tribunal for not transparently resolving the Defense’s pre-trial motions. While my writings, too, have urged the Tribunal to issue written decisions on procedural motions as they arise, I have also noted that the Iraqi legal tradition is to handle such issues in the final written Opinion of the Trial Chamber and that such an approach does not violate international due process standards. The first 54 pages of the Dujail Opinion are devoted to the Defense pre-trial and trial motions, including (1) the challenge to the death penalty in light of the fact that the President of the Coalition Government had suspended it in 2003; (2) the challenge to the legitimacy of the Tribunal in light of the fact that it had initially been established by an Occupying Power; (3) the Defense claim that it did not receive the case dossier and other evidence in a timely manner; (4) the Defense claim that the security conditions and the killing of three defense counsel during the trial rendered the climate inherently unfair; (5) the request for the removal of Judge Ra’ouf for bias; (6) the argument that Saddam Hussein had Head of State Immunity; and (7) the argument that the Tribunal’s Statute constitutes ex post facto law since crimes against humanity were never before recognized in Iraqi law.
While written in a distinctly Iraqi style, the Tribunal does an impressive job of handling these important legal issues, including applying numerous precedents from international Tribunals. The sophistication of the Tribunal’s legal analysis is striking, and I think any objective observer reading these pages would have to disagree with the Human Rights Watch Report’s conclusion that “the level of legal and practical expertise of the key Iraqi actors in the court … is not sufficient to fairly and effectively try crimes of this magnitude.”
The Opinion’s analysis of these Defense motions also indicates how misleading the media reporting has been at times. For example, early in the trial, the media dutifully repeated the Defense claim that Judge Ra’uf was biased against the defendant because he had been sentenced to death by Saddam Hussein and had been the leader of an anti-Bathist organization. Unfortunately, Judge Ra’uf never publicly rebutted this claim during the trial – leaving the impression that the Tribunal’s presiding judge was unfair. The Opinion, however, reveals for the first time that Judge Ra’uf had been arrested and sentenced under the Abdul Salam Aref regime in 1963, which had also arrested and sentenced Saddam Hussein and other members of the Ba’ath party at the same time. Judge Ra’uf was released before Saddam came to power and he practiced law in Baghdad without incident during Saddam’s reign. The so-called anti-Bathist organization Judge Ra’uf established in 1992 was in fact a human rights organization in Kurdistan, which was then an autonomous region that was outside the control of the central government and protected by an American No Fly Zone.
The Opinion acknowledges that statistically nearly all Iraqi civilians had relatives and friends who suffered during the rule of Saddam Hussein and that the Defendants’ antics managed on some occasions to provoke the judge’s ire during the trial. But the Opinion reminds us that the IHT judges had taken an oath to decide the case impartially – a point that other war crimes tribunals have also stressed in explaining why presiding judges should be deemed capable of fairly deciding a case in the absence of actual specific evidence of bias.
Detailed Evidentiary FindingsThe Tribunal’s findings of fact are extremely detailed. The Opinion explains why the testimony of certain witnesses was believed and why others were not. It indicates that hearsay testimony was not given much weight; nor was Saddam’s various admissions. The Opinion describes each piece of documentary evidence, and details the steps undertaken to authenticate the signatures of Saddam Hussein and the other defendants on these documents. And it explains that all of the documents considered by the Tribunal were given to the Defense 45 days before the start of the trial. Reading the Dujail Opinion, one can only conclude that Saddam and the other defendants were convicted on the strength of their own records, much like the Nazis were at Nuremberg.
Important PrecedentsThe Tribunal’s legal analysis explains the theory of criminal responsibility applicable to each defendant and fully examines each of the defendant’s possible legal defenses. From the point of view of establishing a noteworthy legal precedent, two points stand out in the Dujail Opinion.First, Saddam’s main defense was that as a leader, he was entitled to take action against a town that had tried to assassinate him and was populated by insurgents and terrorists allied with Iran at a time when Iraq and Iran were at war. The Opinion details why the actions taken against the town of Dujail and its inhabitants “was not necessary to stop an immediate and imminent danger” and how the actions were disproportionate to the threat. In this way, the Opinion makes clear that there is a line to be drawn in every country’s fight against terrorism, and that Saddam and the other defendants crossed that line.Second, it is noteworthy that the Opinion begins with the case against Awad Al-Bandar, the President of Saddam’s Revolutionary Court, who was charged with using his court as a weapon by conducting an “illusionary trial” and then ordering the execution of 148 villagers of Dujail, including several individuals who were under 18 years of age. Ironically, Al-Bandar was convicted of doing the very thing Human Rights Watch accused the Iraqi High Tribunal of doing – presiding over a trial devoid of due process of law. But the many details of the case against Al-Bandar contained in the Dujail Opinion make it clear how fundamentally different the Iraqi High Tribunal is from Saddam’s Revolutionary Courts. In any event, the legal analysis of the case against Al-Bandar will serve as an important warning to judges in Iraq and elsewhere that they too may face prosecution if they stray from the internationally recognized fair trial requirements. Echoing the Nuremberg-era “Judges Trial,” the Iraqi High Tribunal rejected Al-Bandar’s defense that he “was obliged to do this,” pointing out that he was no “ordinary administrative employee” but “a judge and president of the Tribunal.”
ConclusionOver the next few days, critics will undoubtedly pick apart various aspects of the Dujail Opinion. The English translation is a bit awkward, the text is redundant, and the prose certainly won’t be compared to the opinions of Oliver Wendell Homes or Learned Hand. But even the harshest critics of the Tribunal will have to admit that it did a competent job writing its Opinion, and that the Opinion does answer many of the questions about the fairness of the process.On December 3, 2006, the Defense Counsel filed lengthy briefs appealing various aspects of the Dujail Judgment and Opinion. These will be considered and a final Appeals Chamber decision issued in a few months. Whatever the outcome, the 298-page Dujail Trial Chamber Opinion accomplished one of the most important goals of international justice. Much like the multi-volume set containing the judgment of the World War II Nuremberg Tribunal that is available at every law library in the world, the Dujail Trial Opinion sets forth a detailed and credible historic record, which may one day play a positive role in the establishment of peace in Iraq.
Michael P. Scharf
Professor of Law and DirectorFrederick K. Cox International Law Center
Case Western Reserve University
School of Law
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michael.scharf@case.edu